Introducing competition between groups may induce cooperation to emerge in defection games despite considerable cost of cooperation. If the groups can confine themselves to a cooperative sector, either by providing incentives to raise the cooperation level in one group, or by providing disincentives so that the cooperation level in the other group gets lowered to match that of the first, maximum degrees of cooperation can be obtained. The cooperative sector broadens as the degrees of cooperation increase, or the cost of cooperation decreases, or the group benefits of cooperation increase.
Introduction
The article illustrates cooperation against all odds. Imagine a group rigged such that defection is inevitable. Introducing a second group and specifying conventional competition between the groups may imply that within-group cooperation nevertheless is possible. Two-level analysis involves drawing upon ideas from collective rent seeking, 1 the analysis of the impact of product-market competition on managerial slack, 2 and the analysis of conflict between actors. 3 Each agent makes an individual decision of whether to cooperate or defect, mediated through the within/between-group structure of the model.
The model
In each of two groups with n 1 and n 2 agents, an agent can choose to cooperate through incurring a cost c of effort, or to defect incurring no cost of effort. h i cooperators in group i produce an amount h i B i of payoffs (products, goods, outcomes, prizes, benefits, or rewards) , where B i is the productive efficiency, i=1, 2. We assume that h i B i , and not the aggregate effort h i c, is used as input in the between-group competition for group i's eventual payoff. This is so because c may be utilized differently in the two groups if the group characteristics expressed by the productive efficiencies B 1 and B 2 are different. 4 The total amount h 1 B 1 +h 2 B 2 of payoffs is placed in a common pool which the two groups compete for according to the conventional ratio form (Tullock, 1967) with (h 1 B 1 ) m and (h 2 B 2 ) m as input, where m is a parameter. 5 Payoffs acquired by each group are distributed equally on the group members. A cooperator j in group 1 receives a payoff
where S −1j is the set of strategies by all the n 1 −1+n 2 agents in the two groups except agent j in group 1 who chooses to cooperate. If agent j decides to defect rather than to cooperate, 4 An example considered by Hausken (1995a: 471 ) is a two-island tax system where the within-group efforts are used to invest in 'social welfare, cultural training, military training and equipment, and so on,' all of which are relevant for how the group succeeds in the between-group struggle with the other group. The effort by an agent is thus not devoted directly to the between-group competition, but to the 'within-group machinery,' which may be efficient (B i is large) or inefficient (B i is small) in utilizing it in the between-group competition. For example, if the overall strategy, culture, equipment, or training in one group are lacking, insufficient, or inadequate, it may not matter much whether each agent cooperates because a mechanism at the group-level is not able to utilize the cooperation, which corresponds to a smaller B i for this group.
5 For unitary actors, Hirshleifer (1995) interprets m as a 'decisiveness parameter,' while Tullock (1980) and Nitzan (1994: 44) interpret it as 'the marginal return to lobbying outlays'. m>1 gives a disproportional advantage to group i of producing more payoffs h i B i than the other group, which implies that payoffs are transferred to group i, which can be interpreted as exploiting benefits from economies of scale. m<1 gives a disproportional advantage to each group of producing less payoffs than the other group. For the special case that m=1, n 1 =n 2 , B 1 =B 2 , there is no transfer of payoffs between the groups. The groups then do not appropriate each others' internally generated payoffs, and operate as if in isolation from each other. m=0 causes equal distribution of payoffs between the groups. m<0 means punishing cooperation and placing a premium on defection, which is not considered here. Consider three interpretations of m, one economic/industrial, one political, and one military. First, a low m for industrial imperiums, companies, business firms, enterprises, means that each group can defend itself easily. This can be due to stable market conditions where neither group has an incentive or opportunity to get the upper hand in the competition, where the groups have divided the market geographically or according to target consumer groups, or where heavy sunk costs in production technology, procedures, personnel training, marketing strategies etc. hamper the way in which the groups can change their interference with each other, e.g. through the entering of new markets and employment of new strategies. Second, a low m for some political groups or collective entities in a democratic constitution means wide separation of powers, bills of right, capacities, endowments, and legal entitlements among the groups, which 'reduce the decisiveness of majority supremacy, thereby tending to moderate the intensity of factional struggles. If the political system were winner take all, decisiveness m would be very high and all politics would be a fight to the death' (Hirshleifer, 1995: 32-33) . Third, as Hirshleifer (1995: 32) points out, "in military struggles, low m corresponds to the defense having the upper hand. On the western front in World War I, entrenchment plus the machine gun made for very low decisiveness m. . . But in World War II, the combination of airplanes, tanks, and mechanized infantry allowed the offense to concentrate firepower more rapidly than the defense, thus intensifying the effect of force superiority."
there will be h 1 −1 cooperators in group 1 giving agent j a payoff
(2)
The payoffs to an agent in group 2 are found by permuting the indices in (1) and (2).
Equilibrium analysis
Agent j in group 1 cooperates rather than defects when P 1j (S −1j , c)>P 1j (S −1j , 0), which by inserting (1) and (2), gives
The analogous requirement for group 2 is found by permuting the indices. (3) can also be expressed as c<c r (h 1 , h 2 , B 1 , B 2 , m, n 1 ) which is a necessary and sufficient condition for agent j in group 1 to cooperate with his fellow group members. The key equilibrating variables of interest are h 1 and h 2 . We first determine h 1 for group 1 assuming h 2 , B 1 , B 2 , m, n 1 as fixed. We secondly determine the overall equilibrium h 1 and h 2 for both groups, assuming B 1 , B 2 , m, n 1 , n 2 as fixed. We thirdly carry out comparative statics of h 1 and h 2 .
When (3) is satisfied so that c<c r for a given number h 1 of cooperators in group 1, then the marginal agent j for whom the condition is being evaluated wishes to cooperate; of course, no current cooperator wishes to defect. Given that agent j cooperates, h 1 has now increased with 1, and we may ask whether another current non-cooperator wishes to switch to cooperation. So long as the inequality is maintained, the current non-cooperators wish to become cooperators. Thus, we can imagine a one-by-one process whereby the number of cooperators increases until either a value of h 1 is reached at which c=c r (treating h 1 as real here), or else h 1 =n 1 is reached. On the other hand, if we begin at c>c r , then the opposite occurs. Current cooperators wish to switch to defection, and we can again imagine a one-by-one process whereby they do so until either a value of h 1 is reached at which c=c r or h 1 =0.
Property 1. When the status (including a possible non-equilibrium situation) within group
2 is taken as given, a Nash equilibrium in cooperation/defection strategies for the members of group 1 is a value of h 1 such that either h 1 = 0 and c = c r (an all-defection stable equilibrium); or h 1 = n 1 and c < c r (an all-cooperation stable equilibrium); or 0 < h 1 < n 1 and c = c r (an interior stable or unstable equilibrium).
Property 1 for group 2 is found by permuting the indices. To throw light on Property 1, assume B 1 =B 2 =n 1 =n 2 =1000 agents in the two groups and that m takes on seven values in the range 0≤m≤7. Given h 2 =400 cooperators in group 2, c r for group 1 is given in Fig. 1 .
The familiar case of Fig. 1 is m=1 which gives pure cooperation by all agents when c<1 ∀h i ≥0 (necessary and sufficient requirement), and a prisoner's dilemma and pure defection when 1=B i /n i <c<B i =1000, i=1, 2. Any value c r takes on the above c r =1 and makes the between-group model interesting. For m<1, the requirement for cooperation is more lenient than c<1 for h 1 ≈0, as the very first agents to cooperate may increase their payoff above 0. c r approaches asymptotically a stricter requirement below 1 as h 1 increases. For m>1, h 1 considerably lower than h 2 =400 causes a strict requirement for c because the benefits from cooperation by agent j get expropriated by group 2. When the payoff production in the two groups is similar, h 1 B 1 ≈h 2 B 2 , which gives h 1 ≈h 2 when B 1 =B 2 , the requirement c<c r is lenient, inducing agent j to cooperate even at considerable cost c. This is illustrated by c<4 for h 1 =h 2 and m=7. As h 1 >h 2 , the incentives for agent j to free-ride increases if c is high. To illustrate the three different cases of Property 1, Fig. 2 replicates the curve for m=7 from Fig. 1 , considering three different values of c; c=c h , c=c m , and c=c l . The all-defection stable equilibrium in Property 1 giving h 1 =0 occurs when c is sufficiently high and/or there are considerably fewer cooperators h 1 in group 1 than in group 2. The necessary condition is c>c r . For c=c h , this happens for ∀h 1 , for c=c m , it happens for h 1 < h u 1 , and for c=c l , it happens for h 1 < h 1 1 . The all-cooperation stable equilibrium in Property 1 giving h 1 =n 1 occurs when c is low and there initially are many cooperators h 1 in group 1. The necessary condition is c<c r . For c=c h and c=c m , this never happens, and for c=c l , it happens for h 1 >h 1 1 . The interior equilibrium in Property 1 giving 0<h 1 <n i occurs when c=c r . For c=c h , this never happens, for c=c m , it happens for h 1 = h u 1 (unstable equilibrium) and h 1 = h s 1 (stable equilibrium), and for c=c l , it happens for h 1 = h 1 1 (unstable equilibrium). Assume c=c m . When 0 < h 1 < h u 1 , any cooperator wishes to defect and no current defector wishes to cooperate, so h 1 falls to 0. At h 1 = h u 1 , no member has an incentive to switch in any direction. For h u 1 < h 1 < h s 1 , each current defector wishes to cooperate, and no cooperator wishes to defect, so h 1 increases to h s 1 , at which point no further incentive exists for either a cooperator or a defector to switch. Finally, for h 1 > h s 1 , each current cooperator has an incentive to defect, pushing h 1 back to h s 1 . Observe that all stable interior equilibria has ∂c r /∂h i ≤0. The Nash equilibrium solution for the stable interior equilibrium in groups 1 and 2 can be written as
respectively. The overall Nash equilibrium for the agents in the two groups is given by the simultaneous solution of the two equations in (4), which gives
For the example above where h 2 =400, m=7, and c m =2, the stable interior equilibrium is h s 1 ≈ 547, and the unstable interior equilibrium is h u 1 ≈ 307. To determine the overall equilibrium h o 1 and h o 2 , we need to determine four curves: first, the stable equilibrium value h s 1 = h s 1 (h 2 , ·) for all h 2 , 0≤h 2 ≤1000; second, the unstable equilibrium value h u 1 = h u 1 (h 2 , ·) for all h 2 , 0≤h 2 ≤1000; third, the stable equilibrium value h s 2 = h s 2 (h 1 , ·) for all h 1 , 0≤h 1 ≤1000; fourth, the unstable equilibrium value h u 2 = h u 2 (h 1 , ·) for all h 1 , 0≤h 1 ≤1000. These are shown in Fig. 3 .The interesting part of Fig. 3 is the 'cooperative sector' spanned out by the thick unstable equilibrium curves h u 1 = h u 1 (h 2 , ·) and h u 2 = h u 2 (h 1 , ·). If the groups confine their initial and subsequent location (h 1 , h 2 ) to the cooperative sector, they inevitably get propelled to the overall cooperation equilibrium (h 1 , h 2 )=(1000, 1000). 6 Conversely, if the groups confine their initial and subsequent location outside the cooperative sector, they move to (h 1 , h 2 )=(0, 0). This means that an overall stable internal Nash equilibrium for the two groups does not exist. 
and is reached if h 1 and h 2 throughout the equilibrating process lie within the cooperative sector spanned out by
If confinement to the cooperative sector can not be obtained, the overall Nash all-defection equilibrium
Property 2 has implications for how the rigging, monitoring, and external regulation of competing groups can affect strategic behavior within groups. Maximum degrees h 1 and h 2 of cooperation can be obtained by matching the cooperation levels in the groups with each other, either by providing incentives to raise the cooperation level in one group, or by providing disincentives so that the cooperation level in the other group gets lowered to match that of the first. This ensures a transition into the cooperative sector. If h 1 and h 2 initially are unequal, or the internal dynamics or speed for switching from defection to cooperation is different, movement out of the cooperative sector may occur giving (h 1 , h 2 )=(0, 0). The exactness by which the cooperation levels in the groups are matched is more important the lower are h 1 and h 2 , as indicated by the cooperative sector being narrower for low cooperation levels. Conversely, as h 1 and h 2 increase, the two groups' capacity for mutual cooperation becomes more stable to parameter fluctuations. Hence, Property 2 may still hold when B 1 =B 2 or n 1 =n 2 .
W.r.t. comparative statics, the cooperative sector for given h 1 and h 2 , broadens as c declines, and narrows to the line h 1 =h 2 as c increases to the maximum value of c where c=c r has a unique solution. This happens for h 1 =h m 1 and corresponds to the mountain top in Fig. 2 . For c>c r , there is no cooperative sector and the equilibrium (h o 1 , h o 2 ) = (0, 0) is inevitable. Increasing B 1 and B 2 has a similar effect as decreasing c since one group in isolation has prisoner's dilemma characteristics when 1=B i /n i <c<B i =1000, i=1, 2. Increasing m has an effect as can be seen from Fig. 1 . First, if c is low, increasing m may imply the presence of a cooperative sector. Second, if m is too high, giving fierce between-group competition, the cooperative sector becomes narrower, making a mutual cooperation equilibrium unstable if other parameters fluctuate too much.
As an example of an asymmetry, let B 1 =n 1 =500 and B 2 =n 2 =1000. 7 Fig. 4 plots c r as a function of h 1 and h 2 for m=7. 8 Fig. 4 illustrates how the stable and unstable equilibria change, while being dependent on c, and how a diagonal mountain ridge in a symmetric case changes to a translate which is such that max(c r ) occurs for h 2 ≈250 when h 1 =n 1 =500. Hence, the larger efficiency of production or larger group size B 2 =n 2 =1000 in group 2 must be accompanied with a smaller cooperation level h 2 in group 2 to facilitate the initiation and increase in cooperation in group 1, if c s.t. c<c r is high. If this is satisfied, the two groups move to an equilibrium with a maximum degree h 1 =n 1 of cooperation in the smaller or less efficient group 1, and a lower degree h 2 <n 2 of cooperation in the larger or more efficient group 2. For the smaller group 1, the payoff to each of the h 1 =n 1 =500 cooperators is P 1j (S −1j , c)≈502−c where c<c r =4. For the larger group 2, the payoff to each agent v of the h 2 ≈250 cooperators (adjusted in an equilibrium manner to the nearest whole number) is P 2v (S −2v , c)=249−c where c<c r =4, and the payoff to each defector is P 2v (S −2v , 0)=245. Property 3. When group 1 is smaller or less efficient than group 2, the two groups move to an equilibrium with a maximum degree h 1 = n 1 of cooperation in group 1, and a lower degree h 2 < n u of cooperation in group 2. The payoff to each cooperator in the smaller group 1 is larger than the payoff to each agent (cooperator or defector) in the larger group 2. 9
Conclusion
Cooperation may emerge in defection games if competition between groups is introduced and the degrees of cooperation in the groups are sufficiently matched to fall within a cooperative sector. If the groups gradually inch up on each other within a cooperative sector, no group falling behind or ahead of the other group, maximum degrees of cooperation are obtained. This may occur through providing incentives for cooperation in the least cooperative group, or providing disincentives for cooperation in the most cooperative group. A crucial point is how to get cooperation started since the cooperative sector is narrow for low degrees of cooperation. The cooperative sector broadens as the degrees of cooperation increase, or the cost of cooperation decreases, or the group benefits of cooperation increase.
